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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

7701
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant. ,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

COMMENTS ON RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT
OF FACTS
Respondent makes sweeping charges that appellant has
misstated the record, and in doing so itself glaringly misstates the record. On page 3 of the opening brief, appellant
stated that F. C. Paulsen's sole function as general manager
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was the signing of leases for the Oregon Short Line Railroad
Company. On page 5 of its brief respondent makes the folfolwing accusations. and statements:

"* * * Counsel does not state the facts or
the record properly. The evidence concerning Mr.
Paulsen is that he is General Manager of the Union
Pacific, as well as the Oregon Short Line, properties
within the State of Utah and the designation as general manager in and of itself would indicate that he
would have such rights and duties as normally would
be exercised by any general manager. Counsel for
appellant attempted to infer by his questionings, of
the witnesses that as general manager he had nothing
to do, but the only testimony with respect thereto
was that of Mr. Bachman, who stated with respect to
his. duties, 'Primarily it is. to execute leases and contracts on behalf of the corporate property, the corporate company, the Short Line' (R. 87). This testimony, in spite of what counsel made an attempt to
infer from it, does not say that that was his 'sole
function'.''
The record shows the respondent's charge to be groundless and his statements. to be entirely incorrect. On crossexamination Lester C. Bachman, assistant to the President
of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, testified as follows (R. 87-89) :
What duties does he have as General Manager of the Oregon Short Line ?
"Q.

"A. Primarily it is to execute leases. and contracts on behalf of the corporate property, the corporate company, the Short Line.
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"Q.

You sa.y, 'primarily,' does he have any oth-

er duties?
''A. Those are the o·nes with which I am
familiar.

As Assistant to the President the only
duties that you kno"'· that Mr. Pauls.en has. as General
Manager of the Oregon Short Line is to execute leases
-and what else?
"A. Contracts.
"Q.

"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.

Contracts?
Yes.
What kind of contracts?
May I say leases.

You strike out contracts?
"A. Strike the contracts. There are some service contracts that he can sign.
"Q.

"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.

Well, tell us what they are?
Contracts with draymen.
With draymen?
For pickup and delivery service.

What draymen?
"A. Operators of trucks that handle our pickup
and delivery services.
"Q.

What do you mean 'our'?
"A. That is for the railroad company.

"Q.
"Q.

"A.

Which railroad company?
Union Pacific.

Oh! Well, I am asking you about the Oregon Short Line.
"A. Beg your parden. You have me a little confused.
"Q.
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You have me a little confused. Let us
clear the record about these truckers and deliverymen. You don't mean that the Oregon Short Line
has any contracts with truckmen to haul and deliver
anything? They don't deliver any freight, do they?
''A. No.
"Q.

Well, what leases does Mr. Paulsen sign in
behalf of the Oregon Short Line?
"A. Leases to industries of sites on our Oregon Short Line property."
"Q.

Counsel's statements on page 5 "that the rights, and:
duties normally attributable to the office of general manager would be exercised by Paulsen as General Manager
of the Oregon Short Line," and that Paulsen's duties were
primarily to execute leases. and the assertion that this was
not his sole function are contrary to the undisputed evidence
in the case.
Counsel asserts that there are other officers and employees available for operation as a common carrier in
Utah. What does. the record show? Bachman, testified as
follows:
(R. 89, 90.)
"Q. What employees, other than Mr. Paulsen,
does the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company have
in the State of Utah.

*

*

*

(R. 90.)
"A. I know of none.

*

*

You know of none? Well, might there be
any, do you suppose?
"A. There could he.
"Q.
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"Q.

"A.

But you don't know of them?
I don't know of them.

(R. 96.)

*

*

*

*

*

"A. I know of no Officer that has ever been
appointed to act in a corporate capacity for the
Oregon Short Line in Utah except Mr. Paulsen.
(R. 96.)

*

*

*

*

*

Does the Oregon Short Line have any
trainmasters?
"Q.

"A.

N o.

"Q.

Superintendents? Does it?
No.

"A.

In Utah? And all of this is in Utah. Does
it have any agents?
"Q.

*

(R. 96, 97.)

*

*

*

*

Are there any agents in the State of Utah
for the Oregon Short Line Railroad?
"A. Statutory agents?
"Q.

Any kind of agents?
"A. Well, to the extent that we have Mr. Paulsen as an agent of the corporation.
"Q.

"Q.

''A.
"Q.

"A.

Do you know of any other?
I know of no others..
Any locomotive engineers?
I know of no locomotive engineers.

Or firemen?
"A. Or fireman.

"Q.
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Or brakemen?
"A. Or brakemen.

"Q.

Or conductors,?
"A. No."

"Q.

D. F. Wengert, Superintendent of the Union Pacific
Railroad Company lines within the State of Utah, testified
as follows:
(R. 166.)

And what is your employment?
"A. General Superintendent, South Central
District.
"Q.

"Q.

"A.

For what company or companies.?
Union Pacific.

(R. 167.)

*

*

*

*

*

"THE COURT·: I had one question, Mr. Wengert. Is it of the Union Pacific or of these companies
that you are General Superintendent?
"A. I am General Superintendent of the Union
Pacific for which I cover the properties of the OSL
and the LA&SL from McCammon, Idaho to Los Angeles, California."
(R. 178.)

*

*

*

*

*

In your opening testimony, Mr. Wengert,
you testified that you were employed by the Union
Pacific Railroad?
"A. Right.
"Q.

"Q.

road?
"A.

And not by the Oregon Short Line RailThat's right.
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"Q. And when you testified that you operated
for the Union Pacific over the properties of the
Oregon Short Line and the Los Angeles and Salt
Lake did you mean anything more than train operations?
"A. That is my jurisdiction, is train operation.
"Q.
"A.

Train operation?
Yes sir.

"Q. You didn't mean that you operate the
properties of the Oregon Short Line in the sense
that you leased them and collect rents or anything
like that?
"A. No sir."

Again on page 6 respondent challenges the statement
by appellant to the effect that the only employee of the
Oregon Short Line within the State of Utah is F. C. Paulsen, and emphasizes that Arthur E. Stoddard is President,
Ambrose J. Seitz Vice President and E. G. Smith Secretary.
He might have added that George S. Eccles of Ogden, Utah,
is a Director. Stoddard lives in Omaha, Nebraska; Seitz
lives in Omaha, Nebraska; E. G. Smith lives in New York
City (R. 101). As is shown under II this is hardly appropriate personnel to operate trains and maintain trackage.
Again on page 6 counsel charges appellant with attempting to confuse the issue of the case by asserting that the
Oregon Short Line has not operated as a common carrier in
any particular since January 1, 1936. The evidence shows
without conflict that appellant's statement is entirely accurate.
The very trackage in question here was. built and paid
for by the Union Pacific, not the Oregon Short Line. The
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witness Gini, a Civil Engineer in the office of the Division
Engineer of Union Pacific, testified as follows·:
(R. 151, 152).
"Q. Now Mr. Gini, do you know who built the
track down to where it is now?
"A. Well, the grading has been done by the
Morrison-Knudsen contractors and the trackage was
constructed by our own forces.

"MR. VAN COTT : What does he mean by his
'own forces'?
"Q. First, I will ask-whose jurisdiction are
the section men under in jobs of this nature?
"A. The Division Engineer.

Now what do you mean by 'our own forces'
in constructing the track?
"A. Well, forces has been employed by the
Union Pacific to construct the tracks.
"Q.

And by that do you mean the section men?
"A. Section extra gang, which is a section foreman usually in charge of an extra gang.
"Q.

*

(R. 158, 159).

*

*

*

*

Now you say that the fill for this industry
lead was constructed by Morrison-Knudsen?
"A. Yes.
"Q.

They are contractors, aren't they?
"A. y es s1r.
.

"Q.

Did they enter into a contract with the
Union Pacific for it?
"A. Yes sir.
"Q.
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· 'Q.

"A.

And the Union Pacific paid for it?
Yes sir."

Exhibit "R" is the check in payment to the contractor
who built the grade for this track. It is a check of the Union
Pacific Railroad Company.
Appellant on page 2 of its opening brief made the statement that the lease from the Short Line to Union Pacific is
for one hundred years. Mr. Miner at pretrial said it was
(R. 19). He should have known. The lease is from year to
year. However, reference to Union Pacific Unification, 189
I. C. C. 359, will disclose that Union Pacific not only has
precisely the same officers and directors as the Short Line,
but also that it owns one hundred per cent of the capital
stock of the Short Line. The Short Line, on page 3 of its
brief, asserts that the Short Line could terminate the lease
on three months' notice. Nevertheless it could not resume
operation of the railroad at any time by giving notice as
required by the lease. It would have to file an application
with the I. C. C. permitting it to do so, and the I. C. C.
would have to find that it was. in the public interest to do
so, exactly the opposite of what it held in 189 I. C. C. 359.

I.
IN ORDER FOR A RAILROAD CORPORATION
TO HAVE THE RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN
UNDER THE UTAH STATUTE IT MUST BE A
COMMON CARRIER.
Appellant asserted in the opening brief P. 5 that the
true meaning of Paragraph ( 4) of Section 104-61-1, U. C.
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A. 1943, insofar as it relates to condemnation by railroads
is "* * * railroads * * * for public transportation.'' This construction is conceded by respondent. On page
23 respondent states: "A public use for which eminent
domain may be exercised under that statute as. specified is
'* * * railroads * * * for public transportation'."
As asserted by appellant and conceded by respondent,
therefore, power of eminent domain is given to "railroads
for public transportation." "Public transportation" can
mean nothing other than carriage as a common carrier.
But respondent contends that the statute means that a
corporation which is not a common carrier can nevertheless
exercise the power of eminent domain if, after it acquires
the property, it intends to lease it to another corporation that
is a common carrier. It is submitted that this is a very
strained construction, not justified by anything in the
language of the statute and contrary to the philosophy of the
law justifying constitutionally the delegation of the power
of eminent domain, ·concededly one of the high attributes of
sovereignty, only if the condemnor is engaged in the public
service. It is not enough that the condemnor proposes. to be
a landlord and lease the property to a common carrier.
The Utah Constitution clearly contemplates that railroad companies are, within the meaning of the law, common
carriers of passengers. and freight. On page 13 respondent
quotes only so much of Section 12, Article XII as serves his
purpose. The section in its entirety reads.:
"All railroad and other transportation companies are declared to be common carriers, and subject to legislative control; and such companies shall
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receive and transport each other's passengers and
freight, without discrimination or unnecessary delay."
The reference to railroad companies in the last clause
clearly contemplates that they shall receive and transport
passengers and freight. It is under this section that the
Supreme Court of Utah held in Public Utilities Commission
v. Nelson, 65 Utah 457, 238 P. 237, that the state may not
by mere legislative fiat convert a private business into a
public utility. So in the case at bar. Even if the legislature
had by legislative fiat attempted to designate a corporation
as a common carrier although it is not, has not and cannot
operate as such, it would be unconstitutional.
Respondent relies upon and quotes extensively from
Elliott on Railroads. That author justifies the delegation of
this attribute of sovereignty upon the ground that a railroad corporation is a public utility. Elliott on Railroads,
Second Edition, Volume 2, Section 954, reads. as follows.:
"Since railroads are regarded as of public utility, the delegation to a railroad corporation of the
power to take, by proceedings in invitum, the necessary lands upon which to build its road, is upheld by
all the courts.''
None of the cases cited by respondent hold that the
power of eminent domain may be exercised by a corporation
which is not a common carrier.
In Whitman v. Northern Central Railway Company,
cited by respondent on page 13 of its brief, the only question
was whether the Northern Central Railway Company could
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issue capital stock to pay for improvement and maintenance
of its property. The question was concededly controlled by
the meaning of the Transportation Act of 1920 which defined
a common carrier by railroad to mean "-any corporation
organized for the purpose of engaging in transportation by
railroad subject to this act." Obviously the Northern Central Railway Company was, "organized for the purpose of
engaging in transportation by railroad" and according to
the Maryland court was still so engaged. On page 115 the
Maryland court stated:

"* * *

But we think that contention involves too narrow a construction of the word 'carrier'; for while the lessee does perform the actual
work of transportation over the leased system of railroads, the lessor still has important duties and functions to· perform in connection with that transportar
tion in which the public has a v~tal and immediate
interest amd whick are nec-essarily predicated up()n
and assume its continued status as a carrier. * * *
It was originally chartered as a carrier, it was organized as a carrier, until the lease referred to, it operated a railroad system as a carrier, it is st~ll requirred
to discharge many duties as a carrier, it is now
organized to act as a carrier, and in the event of default on the part of its lessee it must again actively
operate its railroad system as a carrier. Under those
circumstances, it remains now, as it originally was,
a common carrier'' (Italics added) .
None of the things relied upon by the Maryland court
as constituting the Northern Central Railway Company a
common carrier is true of the Oregon Short Line. To be sure
it was, originally organized as a carrier and was a carrier
until January 1, 1936. It is not required to discharge any
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duties as a carrier now and in fact does not discharge any
duties as a carrier and could not do so unless and until it
secured a certificate from the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Public Service Commission certifying that it
was in the public interest for the Short Line to operate
separately from the Union Pacific.
On page 15 respondent relies. on North Carolirna Railroad Compan;y v. Zachary from the Supreme Court of the
United States, arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Respondent's statement of this case fails to show
the basis of the court's decision, which was that inasmuch
as the lessor, under the North Carolina law, was responsible
for all acts of negligence of its lessee, therefore the injured
employee had a direct right of action against the lessor
corporation. On page 254 the court said :

"* * * Under the local law, as. laid down in
Logan v. Railroad, 116 Nor. Car. 940, the lessor is
responsible for all acts of negligence of its lessee occurring in the conduct of business upon the lessor's
road; and this upon the ground that a railroad corporation cannot evade its public duty and responsibility 'by leasing its road to another corporation, in the
absence of a statute expressly exempting it. The
responsibility is held to extend to employees of the
lessee, injured through the negligence of the latter.

*

*

*

*

*

"The court based its decision that the Federal
act did not apply, in part upon the ground that the
North Carolina Railroad is not an interstate railroad-its tracks and property lying wholly within
the State-and that the corporation itself is not, although its lessee is, engaged in interstate commerce;
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the lessor's activities being confined to receiving annual rents and distributing them among ts stockholders. * * *

*

*

*

*

*

"* * * This being the legal situation under
the local law, it seems to us that it must and does
result, in the case before us, that the lessor is a 'common carrier by railroad engaging in commerce between the States,' and that the deceased was 'employed by such carrier in such commerce,' within the
meaning of the Federal act; provided, of course, he
was employed by the lessee in such commerce at the
time he was killed."
It is difficult to see how Lake Superior & Mississippi
Railroad Company v. United States, cited on page 17 of
respondent's brief, is in point. Congress, in making a land
grant to railroads, provided that the United States should
have free use of the railroad as a public highway. The
court held, in view of the history of railroads, that this
meant the roadbed and railroad track alone and did not include transportation. The case does not hold that a railroad
corporation not engaged as a common carrier is entitled to be
regarded in any way as if it were a common carrier.

United States v. Union Stockyards· Company, cited by
respondent on page 19 merely holds that a belt stockyards
railroad operator was within the Safety Appliance Act and
liable for transporting a car in violation of that act. The
defendant was an actual operator of a railroad, held itself
out as such and collected regularly established rates therefor.
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The weakness of respondent's contention in this regard is well exemplified by its going outside the record
and discussing the operations of the American Express
Company. This company files tariffs and schedules for its
operations with the I. C. C. and the P. S. C. U. It maintains
offices in various cities of the United States, including
Salt Lake City, where it receives shipments to be moved
by railway and air transportation. It is true that it does
not itself operate railways and airways but that, of course,
is of no importance in view of its other elements.

Denver R. L. & C. Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, cited by respondent on page 24, arose on plaintiff's
motion to strike from defendant's answer. On page 387
the court said :

"* * * The third answer is that 'the defendant, further answering, respeetfully shows. to the
court and alleges that the said company was organized and is a private corporation for the purpose of
constructing and operating a railroad from certain
coal lands owned, as alleged by the petition, to Denver, and for the purpose of hauling its coal from
said lands to the city of Denver, as private enterprise, and not for the accommodation of the public in
any way or manner whatever.' This answer appears
to be intended to present the question that the road
built by the petitioner is a private road, and not for
public use. It is, however, rather indistinctly stated.
The averment is that the company was organized
for this purpose, and as a private corporation, without a distinct statement as to what the road will be
if built. The inquiry is not as to what the company
was organized for, or whether it will be a private or
public corporation, but what the road will be,-the
structure itself,-if any such thing shall be made."
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This case me·rely supports appellant's contention that the
true character of an alleged railroad company must be determined from its actual characteristics and not by what
it was organized for.
Respondent seems to concede the authority of In Re
Niagara Fa.lls Whirlpool Railw'(J;y Company, 108 N. Y. 37'5,
15 N. E. 429. Respondent relies upon its authority on pages
28, 29 and 35 and. quotes from it on pages 28 and 29. Both
the appellant and respondent rely on the case although
they differ as to its significance in the case at bar. ,Clearly
it holds that whether or not a railroad corporation can
exercise. the power of eminent domain is not to be determined by what its articles of incorporation recite. The
court said:

"* * * Looking at the articles of association
alone, it appears that the company is a railroad corporation organized under the general railroad act
for 'public use in transporting persons and property'
by a railroad to be constructed between certain termini. The papers., on their face, show that the corporation has undertaken an ordinary railroad enterprise within the purview of the act of 1850, in aid
of which the power of eminent domain may be appropriately exercised. But, when we look beyond the
formal documents, and the actual business proposed
to be conducted is considered, we find that the proposed railroad has no proper termini; that it is not
a highway in any just or proper sense; that it cannot, by reason of necessary limitations, perform one
part of the duty it has undertaken, viz., the transportation of freight; that, at most, it can be operated but a portion of the year; and that the sole
object of its construction is to enable the corporation,
for a compensation to be received, to provide for the
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portion of the public who may visit Niagara Falls
better opportunities for seeing the natural attractions of the locality. We feel constrained to say
that, in our judgment, this is not a public purpose
which justifies the exercise of the high prerogative
of sovereignty invoked in aid of this enterprise. The
right of the company being challenged on this
ground, the court is compelled to consider it, and
it is manifest that the inquiry is not precluded because the petitioner has organized itself under the
general railroad act, and has assumed in its· articles
of association the charac·ter of an ordinary railroad
corporation. * * *"
Respondent concedes this to be the law. On page 35
of its brief the respondent says :
"* * * and we admit, and will reiterate, as
was true in the case of Niagara Falls Whirlpool Ry.
Co., if the use proposed is not a public· use, nothing
contained in the articles or charter of a company can
aid the corporation in taking the property sought."

This concedes not only that the proposed use must be
public, but that in coming to that conclusion the actual
business to be conducted by the putative condemnor must
be scrutinized, and that the activities of the putative condemnor must be those of a common carrier? That is precisely what the Niagara case holds. That is elementary and
completely settled, so much so that it is not much discussed
in the cases Iatter ly.
In reasoning about the case at bar one is apt to become
confused by the circumstance that the Short Line was for
many years a common carrier, unquestionably with the right
of eminent domain and that it is closely linked to the Union
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Pacific, which now is a common carrier and undoubtedly
has the power of eminent domain. This gives the Short
Line something of a railroadlike flavor and aroma. Y-et it
is clear and even conceded by respondent that the situation
is no different than as if the Oregon Short Line had been
organized in 1950 and was now seeking to condemn a right
of way not for its own building of a railroad, not for its
own operation of a railroad, but solely for the purpose of
leasing it to another common carrier.
The case is no different than this. supposition case.
Suppose that a railroad called the XYZ Railway Company
projects a railroad between two points in Utah to run
through a narrow canyon, indispensable to the line unless
very expensive tunneling is resorted to. An individual
sensed this difficulty and sought to buy from the owner
the only economical, natural right of way through that canyon. The owner refused to sell. The individual then created
a Utah corporation, named it the Salt Lake Short Line.
To give it something of a railroad flavor it named Stoddard
of Omaha as President, Seitz of Omaha as Vice President,
Smith of New York as Secretary and Paulsen of Salt Lake
as General Manager, with the sole purpose of signing the
lease, and Eccles of Ogden as a director. 'This Short Line
also filed no tariffs, had no trains to carry passengers or
freight, had no train crew and had no present intention of
ever doing any of the things which characterize a common
carrier.
Would anyone have the temerity to contend that the
Salt Lake Short Line could do this? Yes, that is precisely
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what respondent contends in the case at bar. That is precisely 'vhat the Short Line in the case at bar is attempting
to do. It is merely a prospective and potential landlord as
to the property sought to be condemned.
The Niagara case is square authority against the Salt
Lake Short Line. Delegation of the power of eminent domain to such a corporation would be clearly unconstitutional. In the N~~agara Fa.Zls case, 15 N. E. 429, the court said
on page 431:

'' * * * Soon after the passage of the general
railroad act of 1850, the question was raised as to
the validity of the act in so far as it attempted to
confer upon any corporation which might thereafter
be created under its provisions the power to determine when and what private property might be
compulsorily taken for the purposes of its road, and
it was held that the act was a constitutional delegation of the power of eminent domain. Railroad Co.
v. Braz"ruLrd, 9 N. Y. 100. The expediency of this
legislation has been questioned. In the infancy of
railroad enterprises there was little danger that railroads would be projected, not required by public
necessity, or where the public interests would not be
subserved by their construction; but the plan of permitting any persons who might deem it for their
interest to do so, to unite and organize a railroad
corporation and to fix the route, subject practically
to no supervision or control by any public authority,
and to invade and take private property for the purposes of the road wherever the company should see
fit to locate it, is attended with some unquestionable
evils.. It is probably true that many speculative railroad enterprises have been initiated and carried on
under this liberal legislation, which would not have
been authorized if a special charter in each instance
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had been required, or if the power of determining as
to the necessity of the road had been lodged with
some disinterested public body. The right of the state
to authorize the condemnation of private property
for the construction of railroads, and to delegate the
power to take proceedings for that purpose to railroad corporations, has become an accepted doctrine
of constitutional law, and is not open to debate. But
the power is. dormant until the legislature authorizes
its exercise; and the particular corporation which
claims the right to exercise the power must be able
to show a legislative warrant, and, that being shown,
it must be able, further, to establish, if the right is
challenged, that the particular scheme in which it is
engaged is a railroad enterprise within the true
meaning of the decisions which justify the taking
of private property for railroad purposes; or that
the business which it is organized to carry on is
public; and that the taking of private property for
the purposes of the corporation is a taking for public
use."
The case of Railroad Company v. Brainard, 9 N. Y.
100, referred to in the Niagara case, as cited in 185'3, justified constitutionality of the delegation of the power of eminent domain to a railroad corporation upon the ground
that it was a delegation to a common carrier of property
and passengers (although the statute merely called them
railroad corporations) and that, therefore, the interest of
the public and of the railroad were sufficiently identical.
On page 108 the court said :
"It is very evident from the whole scope of the
act under consideration that the Legislature designed
to make these corporations common carriers of persons and property, and to require them to be constantly engaged in such public employn1ent (Story
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on Bailments, §§ 495, 496) ; and it was decided as
long ago as 1837, in the case of Bloodgood v. The
Moha.wk a.nd Hudson River Ra.ilroad Company (18
Wend. 9), in the court of last resort in this State,
that lands taken for the construction of such a road
were taken for public use.

*

*

*

*

*

"But the particular ground of objection relied
upon to show that the act in question is unconstitutional, if I correctly understand it, is that the act
itself does not appropriate the specific land taken
for public use, but delegates to the corporation the
power in each particular case to make the location
and selection.

*

*

*

*

*

"The objection raised to the validity of this act
is certainly of a very grave character, and I have
found much difficulty in answering it satisfactorily
to my own mind. I am, however, after the best consideration which I have been able to bestow upon the
subject, of opinion that this act is not invalid for the
reasons stated. The Legislature has the undoubted
authority to provide for the incorporation of railroad companies by a general act (Const., art. 8, § 1),
and it may by legislative enactment give to them
powers, and impose duties almost exclusively of a
public character and in such cases it may without
doubt lawfully declare that all lands taken for the
construction of their roads shall be deemed taken for
public use."
In the Brainard case the New Yiork Court of Appeals
referred to the decision by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the case of The Boston Water-Power Co. v. The
Boston & Worcester R. R. Co., 23 Pick. 360. That case the
Supreme Judicial ·Court of Massachusetts gave considera-
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tion to whether the delegation of power of eminent domain
to a railroad corporation was constitutional and its reasoning is based upon the fact that the railroad in question was
being built for use by the condemnor as a common carrier.
On page 395 the, court said:

"* * * In the present case we think that the
interests of the corporation and those of the public,
were so nearly coincident, it being plainly for the
advantage of both that the shortest, s~afest and cheapest route should be chosen, that the power might be
safely intrusted to a corporation thus constituted.
This mode of exercising the right of eminent domain, is warranted by numerous precedents, both
in our own ,Commonwealth and in most of the other
States of the Union."
One hundred years after those decisions it has, sometimes been lost sight of, as by the respondent in the case
at bar, that constitutional delegation of power of eminent
domain to a railroad corporation is upheld because the
railroad corporation is engaged in the public service of
carrying passengers and freight and, therefore, the public
interest would probably be protected. So construed, private
ownership of property in the suppositious case and in the
case at bar would be protected against the taking of property
for use merely by a landlord or lessor.

II.
THE OREGON SHORT LINE IS NOT A COMMON CARRIER.
Respondent's contention that the Short Line is, a common carrier reduces itself to an absurdity. The Short Line
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has not had any tariffs on file either with the Public Service
Commission of Utah or the Interstate Commerce Commission since January 1, 1936 (R. 129). If it undertook to perform any service as a common carrier it would violate the
laws both of the State of Utah and of the United States and
be subject to criminal penalties.
Section 76-3-2, ppg. (1), U. C. A. 1943, provides. in part
as follows:
"Every common carrier shall file with the commission, and shall print and keep open to public inspection, schedules showing the rates, fares, charges
and classifications for the transportation between
termini within this state of persons and property
from each point upon its route to all other points
upon any route owned, leased, operated or controlled
by it, and from each point on its route or upon any
route leased, operated or controlled by it to all points,
upon the route of any other common carrier whenever a through route and a joint rate shall have been
established or ordered between any two such
points."
Section 76-6-25, ppgs. ( 1) and (2), provides as follows:
" ( 1) Any public utility which violates or fails
to comply with any provision of the constitution of
this state or this title, or which fails, omits o~
neglects to obey, observe or comply with any order,
decision, decree, rule, direction, demand or requirement, or any part or provision thereof, of the commission, in a case in which a penalty has not hereinbefore been provided for such public utility, is
subject to a penalty of not less than $500 nor more
than $2,000 for each and every offense.
" ( 2) -Every violation of the provisions of this
title or of any order, decision, decree, rule, direction,
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demand or requirement, or any part or prov1s1on
thereof, of the commission, by any corporation or
person is a separate and distinct offense, and, in case
of a continuing violation, each day's continuance
thereof shall be a separate and distinct offense."
49 U. S. C. A., Sec. 6, ppg. ( 1) provides as follows:
"Every common carrier subject to the provisions
of this, chapter shall file with the commission created
by this. chapter and print and keep open to public
inspection schedules showing all the rates, fares,
and charges. for transportation between different
points on its own route and between points on its
own route and points on the route of any other carrier by railroad, by pipe line, or by water when a
through route and joint rate have been established."
49 U. S. C. A., Sec. 6, ppg. (7) provides in part as follows:
"No carrier, unless otherwise provided by this
chapter, shall engage or participate in the transportation of passengers or property, as defined in this
chapter, unless, the rates, fares and charges upon
which the same are transported by said carrier have
been filed and published in accordance with the provisions of this chapter."
49 U. S. C. A., Sec. 6, ppg. (1), provides as follows:
"In case of failure or refusal on the part of any
carrier, receiver, or trustee to comply with the terms
of any regulation adopted and promulgated or any
order made by the commission under the provisions
of this section, such carrier, receiver, or trustee shall
be 'liable to a penalty of $500 for each such offense,
and $25 for each and every day of the continuance
of such offense, which shall accrue to the United
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States and may be recovered in a civil action brought
by the United States."
Rules to govern the Construction and Filing of FreightRate Publications were revised and promulgated by the I.
C. C. in Tariff Circular No. 20 effective Oct. 1, 1928 and
supplemented by the I. C. C. effective Dec. 1, 1937. Respondent has no tariffs filed in conformity thereto (R. 129).
The Short Line has not carried either freight or passengers since January 1, 1936 (R. 85, 90, 96, 97, Ex. C). If
it attempted to do so it would violate the laws of Utah and the
United States.
Moreover, the Short Line has no employees such as are
necessary to operate as a common carrier (R. 90, 96, 97). It
has no engineers, firemen, conductors, brakemen, trainmasters, etc., etc. (R. 90, 96, 97, 166, 167).
Respondent on pages 5 and 6 emphasizes that it not only
has a General Manager, Mr. Paulsen, in the State of Utah,
but that it also has other officers, to wit, Arthur E. Stoddard, President; Ambrose J. Seitz, Vice-President; E. G.
Smith, Secretary. In addition it might be mentioned that
it also has George S. Eccles in Ogden, Utah, as a Director.
Seitz, Stoddard and Smith occasional'ly come to Utah, although they live elsewhere. Would it be possible for these
five men to operate a freight or passenger train? Would
Paulsen be the engineer, Stoddard the fireman, Seitz a brakeman, Smith a brakeman, and Eccles conductor? If they did
so and carried either a passenger or as much as a pound
of freight, they would be guilty of unlawful acts under the
laws of Utah and the United States.
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A common carrier must maintain its railroad. Would
Eccles be roadmaster; Smith section foreman; Paulsen,
Stoddard and Seitz section laborers? The latter are somewhat old and infirm for the assignment.
On page 10 of its brief respondent makes a concession
which destroys its contention that it is a common carrier.
It says:
"We wil'l agree that neither a ·corporation nor an
individual can be either in law or in fact a common
carrier unless such corporation or individual holds
itself or himself out to the public as being willing to
undertake for hire to transport persons or commodities generally for the entire public, or has been
so engaged in transporting and holding out to transport for the public generally."
The Utah Statute and United States Statute say what
must be done to hold oneself out as a common carrier. Re-spondent has not done so. The Short Line's concession
destroys its contention.
Despite all of the squirming by respondent, the record
shows without any contradiction that the Oregon Short
Line, since January 1, 1936, has. not operated in any particular as a common carrier. It has operated no trains whatever, it has carried no passengers or freight whatever, it
has not published any tariffs setting forth its rates for carriage as a ·Common carrier, it has had no personnel available
for the operation of trains and the carriage of freight or
passengers, it has· had no personnel available for the construction or maintenance of any railroad trackage. Respondent cannot escape from the undisputed record which clearly
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demonstrates that the Oregon Short L~ine is not and has
not been and could not be since January 1, 1936, engaged
in any particular whatever as a common carrier.

III.
RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT IT· ·CAN
CONDEMN EVEN THOUGH IT HA8 LEASED
ITS PROPERTY TO THE UNION PACIFIC IS
ITS OWN MAN OF STRAW.
In Section 4, pages 43 to 63, respondent creates a man
of straw and attempts to destroy it by contending that even
though it has leased all of its property to the Union Pacific it can nevertheless condemn. Respondent admits. that
this question is posed by the respondent and not by the appellant. In spite of the fact that the appellant has not suggested the question, counsel contends that it is the principal
point in issue. Appellant has never contended that a railroad corporation which leases its property is thereby automatically prohibited from condemnation. Appellant's contention is that the Short Line is not a common carrier and
therefore cannot condemn property. Appellant so stated
at pretrial \Vhen respondent first cited these cases. At R.
20 counsel for appellant made the following statement:
"MR. VAN COTT': Well, I haven't had a chance
to read these cases. Of course I will, but so far as
anything he read is concerned it didn't get to the
point we have because there is nothing to show in
any one of those cases that those plaintiffs in the
condemnation proceedings were not common carriers
for hire. They could well have leased their property
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and remain common carriers. I will read the cases
and analyze them and give the ~court the benefit of
my views when that question comes up at the trial.
"But in this State even if a statute, we will say
a statute undertook to give a corporation the power
of eminent domain and that corporation was not a
public use, was not a common carrier, as long as we
are dealing with railroads, it would be unconstitutional. Even the legislature cannot. give the power
of eminent domain to a. person or a corporation
which is not engaged in public service except in certain isolated examples. We have a lot of authority
on this subject in this State without going outside of

it."
It might have leased its property and yet be a common
carrier by holding itself out as such for the carriage of
passengers and freight pursuant to tariffs filed with the
I. c .. C. and the P. S. :c. U. as does the Railway Express
Company. None of the cases cited by .counsel on this point
holds that a railroad company can condemn property even
though it is not a common carrier nor does any case in respondent's brief so hold.

IV.
APPELLANT'S ST'ATEMENT OF POIN'TS
CLEARLY DISCLOSES THAT APPELLANT
CONTENDED THAT THE PURPOSE OF CONDEMNATION MUST BE PUBLIC.
On pages 31 and 32 respondent argues that no attack
was made by appellant in its State1nent of Points upon
which appellant will rely upon Finding No. 22 and Conclusion No. 3 and that therefore appellant cannot argue or
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contend before this Court that the purpose for which respondent seeks to condemn is not a public purpose. This
misconceives the entire nature of the Statement of Points
upon which appellant will rely provided for in Rule 75,
paragraph (d). This rule states that no assignment of
errors is necessary. Moreover, no statement of points is
necessary unless the appellant does not designate for inclusion the complete record. If a statement of points is
necessary, it is only necessary to inform the respondents
of the contentions to be made, so that the respondent may
form his opinion as to what portions of the record should
be included. Appellant's statement of points· fully advised
respondent of the contention which appellant has made in
this record. In paragraphs 3 and 4 of the statement it is
clearly set up that appellant will contend that the respondent is not engaged in the rendition of any public service.
On page 31 respondent states that appellant did not
request that there be included in the record any evidence
given by public witnesses owning property in the area involved to the effect that they needed trackage, wanted trackage, and requested trackage. That evidence has nothing
whatever to do with the contention made by appellant in
this record. Appellant's contention is that the Short Line
is not a common carrier and that therefore the purpose is
not public. It is entirely immaterial whether individual
members of the public wants this spur built or not, so far
as appellant's contention is concerned. Everybody in Salt
Lake County might desire to have Sears Roebuck build an
addition on its building. That would not make it a public
purpose. Everybody in Salt Lake County might desire to
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have landlord Oregon Short Line Railroad Company condemn a right of way. That would not make it a public
purpose.
Respectfully submitted,
VANCOTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant.
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